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Social institutions often use rewards and penalties to promote cooperation. Providing incentives 2 
tends to be costly, so it is important to find efficient policies for the combined use and synthesis 3 
of rewards and penalties. Most studies of cooperation have, however, addressed rewarding and 4 
punishing in isolation and have focused on peer-to-peer sanctioning as opposed to institutional 5 
sanctioning. Here, we demonstrate that an institutional sanctioning policy we call ‘first carrot, 6 
then stick’ is unexpectedly successful in promoting cooperation. The policy switches the 7 
incentive from rewarding to punishing when the frequency of cooperators exceeds a threshold. 8 
We find that this policy establishes and recovers full cooperation at lower cost and under a wider 9 
range of conditions than either rewards or penalties alone, in both well-mixed and spatial 10 
populations. In particular, the spatial dynamics of cooperation make it evident how punishment 11 
acts as a ‘booster stage’ that capitalizes on and amplifies the pro-social effects of rewarding. 12 
Together, our results show that the adaptive hybridization of incentives offers the ‘best of both 13 
worlds’ by combining the effectiveness of rewarding in establishing cooperation with that of 14 
punishing in recovering it, and thus provides a surprisingly inexpensive and widely applicable 15 
method of promoting cooperation. 16 
Keywords: punishment; rewards; public goods; evolutionary games; social design17 
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1. Introduction 18 
Cooperation is desirable whenever groups of cooperating individuals can reap higher 19 
benefits than groups of individuals acting for individual self-interest. Promoting cooperation can 20 
be difficult, however, because a single non-cooperating individual (‘defector’) in a group of 21 
cooperators often achieves a higher net benefit by free-riding on the others’ contributions. An 22 
efficient policy for promoting cooperation needs to overcome two fundamental challenges: to 23 
ensure that cooperators can gain a foothold in a community of defectors, and to protect a 24 
community of cooperators from exploitation by defectors once cooperation has been established. 25 
Incentives can help overcome these challenges (Balliet et al., 2011; Ostrom, 1990; 26 
Sigmund, 2007). The promise of reward or the threat of punishment can induce cooperation 27 
among self-interested individuals who would otherwise prefer actions that undermine the public 28 
good. At first glance, there might seem to be little difference between a reward and a penalty: 29 
After all, cooperation is induced whenever the size of the incentive exceeds the payoff difference 30 
between a cooperator and a defector, irrespective of whether the incentive is positive or negative 31 
(Sasaki et al., 2012). This equivalence ceases to hold, however, when one considers the 32 
challenge of implementing an institutional incentive scheme. Rewarding a large number of 33 
cooperators, or penalizing a large numbers of defectors, are either very costly or become 34 
ineffective when a limited budget for incentives is stretched out too far. Pamela Oliver 35 
exemplifies this with the problem of fund-raising (Oliver 1984): ‘If only 5% of the population 36 
needs to contribute to an Arts Fund for it to be successful, they can be rewarded by having their 37 
names printed in a program: It would be silly and wasteful to try to punish the 95% who did not 38 
contribute.’ While the challenges of implementing positive and negative incentives are separately 39 




well known (Balliet et al., 2011; Sigmund, 2007), no study to date has established how such 40 
incentives should best be combined at an institutional level to promote cooperation. 41 
Here, we demonstrate how an institution implementing incentives can effectively establish 42 
and recover cooperation at a low cost. Institutional sanctioning is widespread (Casari & Luini, 43 
2009; Chen et al., 2013; Cressman et al., 2012, 2013; Cuesta et al., 2008; Falkinger, 1996; 44 
Kanazawa et al., 2009; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Ostrom, 1990; Sasaki 2013; Sasaki et al., 2012; 45 
Sigmund et al., 2010; Vasconcelos et al., 2013), but surprisingly few theoretical studies have 46 
thus far considered the effects of institutionalized incentives on the evolution of cooperation, and 47 
the few studies which exist have considered rewarding and punishing in isolation (Cuesta et al., 48 
2008; Sasaki 2013; Sasaki et al., 2012), or did not consider how optional incentives change with 49 
the frequency of cooperators (Cressman et al., 2012, 2013; Kanazawa et al., 2009). Indeed, 50 
sanctioning entities such as officers and managers often alter the strengths of reward and 51 
punishment dynamically as events unfold. We address this question in an established game-52 
theoretical framework for studying cooperation under institutionalized incentives (Sasaki 2013; 53 
Sasaki et al., 2012). By considering the incentives’ strengths as independent variables, we can 54 
encompass a range of hybrid incentive policies. In particular, by allowing relative allocation of 55 
incentives to rewarding and punishing to vary with the frequency of cooperators, our framework 56 
includes hybrid incentive policies controlled by adaptive feedback from the community’s state. 57 
2. Model 58 
Our model is based on the public good game, recognized as the most promising 59 
mathematical metaphor for studying cooperation in large groups (Hauert et al., 2006). We posit 60 




well-mixed populations of interacting individuals. From time to time, individuals randomly 61 
selected from the population form an n-player group, with 2n ? . A cooperator invests a fixed 62 
amount 0c ?  into a common pool, whereas a defector invests nothing. The total contribution is 63 
thus then multiplied by a public-benefit factor 1r ?  and distributed equally among all n group 64 
members. The infamous ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968) arises when r n?  and no 65 
incentives are applied, because single individuals can then improve their payoffs by withholding 66 
their contributions. The total budget for providing incentives is given by n?  per group, where 67 
0? ?  is the per capita incentive. This budget n?  is then divided into two parts based on a 68 
relative weight w with 0 1w? ? : The part wn?  is shared among the Cn  cooperators in the group 69 
(see also Chen et al., 2013 for application to the N-person volunteer’s dilemma), who thus each 70 
obtains a reward Cawn n? , while the remainder is used for punishing the Cn n?  defectors, who 71 
thus have their payoffs reduced by C(1 ) ( )b w n n n?? ? . The factors , 0a b ?  are the respective 72 
leverages of rewarding and punishing, i.e., the factors by which a recipient’s payoff is increased 73 
or decreased relative to the cost of implementing the incentive. We assume replicator dynamics 74 
(Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998) and account for feedback from the community’s state by allowing 75 
the weight w to depend on the frequency of cooperators x, ( )w w x? . Pure rewarding and pure 76 
punishing correspond to ( ) 1w x ?  or ( ) 0w x ? , respectively Therefore, a cooperator and a 77 




  and  rcn rcnawn b w nc
n n n n n
? ??? ? ? ? ,        (1) 79 
respectively. 80 




We now consider an institutional sanctioning policy we call ‘first carrot, then stick’, 81 
through which incentives are allocated to rewarding when cooperators are rare and to punishing 82 
when defectors are rare. This naturally raises the question of whether the transition between 83 
rewarding and punishing should be gradual or abrupt, and at which frequency of cooperation it 84 
should occur. As the criteria for answering this question, we will consider the sanctioning 85 
policy’s effectiveness and efficiency in promoting cooperation. By effectiveness, we mean the 86 
parameter range for which full cooperation can be established or recovered with certainty, while 87 
by efficiency we mean the cumulative cost and total time required for converting a community of 88 
defectors to full cooperation or for recovering full cooperation from invasion of a single defector. 89 
3. Results 90 
We find that a sudden switch from rewarding to punishing, when the frequency of 91 
cooperators in the community surpasses a threshold, is the most effective and the most efficient 92 
policy for promoting cooperation. For well-mixed populations, we can prove that this specific 93 
hybridization of the two incentives maximizes the relative payoff of cooperators, a condition 94 
which in turn ensures that the sanctioning policy is most effective for converting a community of 95 
defectors to cooperation (Fig. 1a–f; see the electronic supplementary material for the 96 
mathematical proof). By combining the strengths of rewarding and punishing, this hybridization 97 
of incentives is far more effective than punishing in establishing cooperation (Fig. 1c,e) and far 98 
more effective than rewarding in recovering cooperation (Fig. 1b,f). Offering the ‘best of both 99 
worlds’, the most effective ‘first carrot, then stick’ policy of rewarding and punishing will 100 
hereafter be called the adaptive hybrid. 101 




Although it is natural to expect that the threshold at which the adaptive hybrid switches 102 
from rewarding to punishing could change from one situation to another, it turns out that this is 103 
not the case: this threshold remains the same independent of the per capita incentive δ and the 104 
public-benefit factor r. When there is no difference in leverage between positive and negative 105 
incentives ( a b? ), this threshold corresponds to a frequency of cooperators of exactly 50%. In 106 
practice, punishing is often more effective than rewarding (Baron, 2009) ( a b? ), in which case 107 
the switching point for hybridization is lower than 50% (the electronic supplementary material, 108 
Fig. S1). 109 
The adaptive hybrid policy is also more efficient for establishing and recovering 110 
cooperation than either rewarding or punishing alone (Fig. 2a–f). Once a state of full cooperation 111 
has been reached, punishing is cheaper as a means of recovering cooperation, since it needs to be 112 
used only occasionally. As the adaptive hybrid policy stipulates punishment once the frequency 113 
of cooperators surpasses the threshold, it is similar to pure punishment in this respect. The two 114 
policies differ markedly, however, in the cost of converting a community of defectors to a 115 
community of cooperators. The adaptive hybrid policy has the lowest cumulative costs of all 116 
three policies and hence requires both the lowest establishment cost and the lowest recovery cost 117 
for full cooperation. With respect to conversion speed, it generically takes a similar (finite) time 118 
for all three policies to establish and recover cooperation (the electronic supplementary material, 119 
Fig. S2). 120 
In the real world, social planning tends to be spatially distributed and is often assisted by 121 
sanctioning institutions. To see whether the adaptive hybrid policy copes well with the resultant 122 
spatio-temporal complexity, we extend our framework to a spatial population inhabiting an 123 




N N?  square lattice with periodic boundaries. Each individual in this lattice joins a public good 124 
game with its four nearest neighbours ( 5n ? ) and updates its strategy probabilistically based on 125 
its resultant payoff. The sanctioning institution receives feedback locally from the five local 126 
participants and the implementation of the hybrid incentive policy therefore varies across the 127 
lattice, as local conditions require. In equation (1), x denotes the frequency of cooperators within 128 
a given neighbourhood. 129 
The adaptive hybrid policy is superior also in spatial populations (Fig. 1g–l). Unexpectedly, 130 
it gives rise to spatial patterns of cooperation and defection that cannot easily be predicted from 131 
those of either rewarding or punishing alone. For small and large incentives, emerging patterns 132 
from a single cooperator resemble those observed under pure rewarding and punishing, 133 
respectively. Cooperators thrive under a policy of pure rewarding (Fig. 3a), forming local 134 
mixtures with defectors, but ultimately fail to establish a cooperative norm for the incentive 135 
strength considered. With pure punishing (Fig. 3b), an invasion which begins with a single 136 
cooperator always results in a cluster of cooperators that grows and eventually displaces all 137 
defectors. The adaptive hybrid policy, in contrast, exhibits an intriguing transition between these 138 
two distinct patterns for intermediate incentive strengths. Fragmented islands of cooperators, 139 
initially inspired by rewarding, create circumstances under which punishing can act as a ‘booster 140 
stage’ that capitalizes on and amplifies the pro-social effects of rewarding, promoting the rapid 141 
growth of cooperator clusters (Fig. 3c). All three policies are capable of recovering cooperation 142 
in much the same way as for well-mixed populations. The only qualitative difference is that an 143 
initially single defector can occasionally cause the separation of connected cooperators into sub-144 
clusters. This has been demonstrated for the spatial extension of the well-studied Prisoner’s 145 
Dilemma (Fu et al., 2010), but occurs in our model only for vanishing or very small incentives. 146 




In the electronic supplementary material, we demonstrate the robustness of our results with 147 
respect to the following model variants. (i) First, we establish that in spatial populations, the 148 
adaptive hybrid policy with either local or global feedback establishes and recovers full 149 
cooperation at lower cost and under a wider range of conditions than a natural alternative 150 
hybridization of incentives in which the reward weight w is proportional to the frequency of 151 
cooperators (Fig. S3). Furethmore, information about the local degree of cooperation allows an 152 
institution which implements the adaptive hybrid policy to establishing full cooperation more 153 
readily that information about the global, population-wide, degree of cooperation (c.f. 154 
Vasconcelos et al., 2013). This is in line with expectations, as tailoring a strategy to local 155 
conditions should generally achieve better results than a strategy which depends on conditions 156 
that are averaged across large spatial scales. We also explore (ii) a variant of the public good 157 
game, in which a cooperator does not benefit from its own contribution (Sasaki et al., 2012) (Fig. 158 
S4), and (iii) a variant of the incentive scheme, in which we relax the assumption that the 159 
received incentive is inversely proportional to the number of cooperators or defectors in an 160 
interacting group (Sasaki et al., 2012) (Fig. S5). We also test variants of our spatial model with 161 
(iv) interactions encompassing the eight nearest neighbors (Roca et al., 2009; Szabό & Fáth, 162 
2007) (chess-king move, 9n ? , Fig. S6), (v) smaller population size (Fig. S7), (vi) asynchronous 163 
updating (Roca et al., 2009; Szabό & Fáth, 2007) (Fig. S8), (vii) proportional imitation rule 164 
(Roca et al., 2009; Szabό & Fáth, 2007) (Fig. S9), (viii) errors in perception and implementation 165 
(for individuals (Hilbe & Sigmund, 2010) or institutions (Gächter, 2012), Figs. S10–14), and (ix) 166 
varied switching points (Fig. S15). All variants (ii)–(viii) do not qualitatively affect the results 167 
regarding the applicability and efficiency of incentives (Figs. S4–14). Exploring (ix) reveals that 168 
the optimal switching point for the spatial model is again around 50%, as in a well-mixed 169 




population when there is no difference in leverage between positive and negative incentives (Fig. 170 
S15). As a final model variant, we assume that individuals share the cost of funding the incentive 171 
budget (Sasaki et al., 2012; Sasaki 2013), and find that the resultant dynamics are entirely 172 
unaffected. 173 
4. Discussion 174 
We have demonstrated how an institutional sanctioning policy of ‘first carrot, then stick’ 175 
can be surprisingly successful in promoting cooperation. The first-carrot-then-stick policy 176 
establishes and recovers cooperation at a lower cost and under a wider range of conditions than 177 
either rewards or penalties alone. Our findings are based on the public good game, a standard 178 
framework for cooperation in groups. They apply to both well-mixed and spatial populations and 179 
remain robust under a broad spectrum of model variations and parameter combinations.  180 
Rewards and penalties are frequently used in concert to promote cooperation. Considering 181 
how often they are used together, at all levels from parents to teachers and leaders of 182 
organizations, it is surprising that no prior study to date has investigated how to optimally use a 183 
combination of rewards and penalties in an institutional setting. Unexpectedly, we found that the 184 
optimal strategy is not a gradual change in the relative allocation towards rewards and penalties, 185 
but a sudden switch once cooperation is sufficiently widespread. When the first-carrot-then-stick 186 
policy is used to promote cooperation in spatio temporal populations, it interestingly gives rise to 187 
complex spatial patterns of cooperators and defectors that differ qualitatively from the simpler 188 
patterns that arise when rewards or penalties are used in isolation. This is because punishment 189 
acts as a booster stage that reinforces the pro-social effects of rewarding, thus allowing 190 




cooperation to be rapidly established in those parts of a population where the cooperative level 191 
has surpassed the critical threshold. Although our analytical methods do not extend to spatial 192 
populations, extensive numerical investigations confirm that a sudden switch from rewarding to 193 
punishment, not a gradual change in the relative allocation, is the optimal institutional 194 
sanctioning policy for promoting and recovering cooperation also in spatial populations. 195 
Our theoretical results can be compared with the handful of experimental studies that have 196 
explored the combined use of positive and negative incentives in peer-sanctioning (Andreoni et 197 
al., 2003; Kamijo & Takeuchi, 2007; Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010) or by an assigned 198 
team leader (Gürerk et al., 2009). Although these studies differ significantly in their experimental 199 
design, they share two common characteristics. First, punishment is typically more effective than 200 
rewarding at promoting high contributions to the public good. Second, players initially have a 201 
propensity for rewarding cooperation, which is soon superseded by a propensity for punishing 202 
defectors (Kamijo & Takeuchi, 2007; Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010). While the latter 203 
trend might superficially be interpreted as corroborative evidence for the effectiveness of the 204 
institutional sanctioning policy developed here, the rationale for shifting from positive to 205 
negative incentives is strikingly different. In the experimental studies, this shift typically 206 
coincides with declining average contributions and can thus be interpreted as a response to the 207 
emergence of defectors (Gürerk et al., 2009). In particular, the study on team leadership concluds 208 
that ‘leaders who experience frequent complete free-riding and high variance in contributions in 209 
their teams are more likely to switch from positive to negative incentives’ (Gürerk et al., 2009), 210 
while other studies find that punishing is more effective than rewarding at staving off complete 211 
free-riding (Kamijo & Takeuchi, 2007; Sefton et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2010). By contrast, we 212 
have demonstrated the advantage of shifting from positive to negative incentives as contributions 213 




increase, and we predict that rewarding is more effective than punishing in staving off complete 214 
free-riding (c.f. Szolnoki & Perc, 2012). 215 
We have determined the optimal sanctioning policy for a social institution charged with 216 
overseeing rational agents. Two complementary studies on peer-sanctioning that account, 217 
respectively, for reputation effects and the potential of group selection have similarly highlighted 218 
the role of positive incentives in promoting incipient cooperation among defectors (Herold, 219 
2012; Hilbe & Sigmund, 2010). These theoretical predictions derived under the assumption of 220 
rational behaviour clearly question the wisdom of the human behaviour observed in the 221 
aforementioned experimental studies. Understanding whether punishment in the face of rampant 222 
defection is a human fallacy or a rational choice under circumstances other than those analyzed 223 
here is a key challenge for future research.  224 
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Figure legends 304 
Fig. 1. Effects of institutional incentive policies on public good games. The adaptive hybrid 305 
policy has the broadest domain of applicability for establishing full cooperation (green) from an 306 
initially single cooperator (first and third columns from the left), and also for recovering it 307 
against an initially single defector (second and fourth columns from the left). With no or very 308 
small incentives, full defection (red) is the only evolutionary outcome, and with sufficiently large 309 
incentives, so is full cooperation; this applies to all three incentive policies. Intermediate 310 
incentives have strikingly different impacts, as follows. Rewarding: (a, b, g, h) In well-mixed 311 
populations, the outcome is independent of the initial condition; (a) and (b) are identical. In 312 
spatial populations, by contrast, full cooperation and full defection are more likely to be 313 
maintained when the public-benefit factor r is large and the per capita incentive δ is small [upper 314 




left corners of (g) and (h), respectively]. Punishing: (c, d, i, j) When the institution increases δ 315 
beyond a threshold value (which depends on r), full defection abruptly changes into full 316 
cooperation. Differences between (c) and (d), or (i) and (j), indicate combinations of r and δ for 317 
which full cooperation and full defection are both stable, and for which initial conditions 318 
therefore affect the outcome. The difference between (c) and (i) indicates that, interestingly, 319 
spatial population structure much reduces the range of combinations of r and δ for which a single 320 
cooperator can invade, especially for large r. In (i) [and also in upper parts of (g) and (j), lower 321 
parts of (k) and (l)], the narrow (yellow) band between no and full cooperation results from the 322 
survival probability of the initial cooperator (and therefore does not indicate the coexistence of 323 
cooperators and defectors). Adaptive hybrid: (e, f, k, l) The domain of recovering full 324 
cooperation is almost equal to the case of punishing (f and l), while the domain of establishing 325 
full cooperation is much enlarged relative to the case of punishing (e and k). In particular, as the 326 
institution increases δ, the equilibrium frequency of cooperators gradually rises, and when δ 327 
crosses a threshold value (again dependent on r), which is smaller than in the case of punishing, 328 
full cooperation is established abruptly (e and k). Parameters: n = 1, c = 1, a = b = 1, k = 10, and 329 
N = 100 (population’s size 10,000). 330 
 331 
Fig. 2. Costs for establishing and recovering full cooperation. The adaptive hybrid policy is not 332 
only most effective (Fig. 1), but also least expensive in establishing full cooperation from an 333 
initially single cooperator (first and third columns from the left), and in recovering full 334 
cooperation against an initially single defector (second and fourth columns from the left). If no or 335 
very small incentives are provided, achieving each of these goals is impossible (white regions), 336 




independent of the institution policy. Otherwise, these policies have strikingly different impacts 337 
on the required cumulative costs. Rewarding: (a, b, g, h) Both in well-mixed and in spatial 338 
populations, rewarding is not least expensive; in particular, rewarding requires recovery costs 339 
that are 1,000–100,000 times more expensive than either punishing or the adaptive hybrid policy. 340 
This relative cost difference furthermore increases in proportion to the population’s size. 341 
Punishing: (c, d, i, j) In the case of punishing, recovery costs are much reduced relative to the 342 
case of rewarding, while establishment costs remain at a similarly high level as or even slightly 343 
larger than in the case of rewarding. Adaptive hybrid: (e, f, k, l) The adaptive hybrid policy 344 
requires recovery costs that are similar to the case of punishing (and thus much lower than in the 345 
case of rewarding), but substantially reduces establishment costs relative to either rewarding or 346 
punishing. (For understanding the costs right at the border to the white regions, see the electronic 347 
supplementary material, Fig. S2.) All parameters are as in Fig. 1. 348 
 349 
Fig. 3. Emerging patterns of cooperation. For each incentive policy, the sequence of panels 350 
displays the spatio-temporal dynamics of cooperation, starting from a single cooperator located 351 
at the population’s centre. Rewarding: (a) A mixed region of cooperators and defectors expands 352 
until small cooperator clusters occur across the whole population (electronic supplementary 353 
material, movie S1). Punishing: (b) The initially single cooperator expands into a compact 354 
cluster of cooperators, which eventually covers the entire population (electronic supplementary 355 
material, movie S2). Adaptive hybrid: (c) The initial spread of small cooperator clusters closely 356 
resembles the case of rewarding. This prepares the ground for local switches from rewarding to 357 
punishing, which enables the expansion of compact clusters of cooperators. This ‘booster stage’ 358 




enables the establishment of full cooperation with much lower incentives δ than is possible in the 359 
case of punishing (electronic supplementary material, movie S3). Parameters: r = 2, and δ = 0.22 360 
(a), 0.75 (b), or 0.22 (c). All other parameters are as in Fig. 1. 361 
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